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PCAOB inspection reports and audit quality
Katherine A. Gunny a,⇑, Tracey Chunqi Zhang b,1
aUniversity of Colorado, Boulder, Leeds School of Business, 419 UCB, Boulder, CO 80309, United States
b Singapore Management University, School of Accountancy, 60 Stamford Rd., Singapore 178900, Singapore
a b s t r a c t
With the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB), audit ﬁrm oversight shifted away from self-
regulation to independent regulation. The inspections program is
the central feature of the PCAOB. We examine whether PCAOB
inspections are able to distinguish actual audit quality (as opposed
to perceived) during the period inspected to better understand this
important regulatory tool. We use three measures that proxy for
actual audit quality: abnormal accruals, restatements, and the pro-
pensity to issue a going concern opinion. For triennially inspected
auditors, we ﬁnd that PCAOB inspections are associated with lower
audit quality when the reports are seriously deﬁcient (weaker
results for deﬁcient reports). More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd clients of
triennially inspected auditors that receive a deﬁcient or seriously
deﬁcient report are associated with signiﬁcantly higher abnormal
current accruals and clients of auditors that receive a seriously
deﬁcient report are associated with a greater propensity to restate.
Our evidence is subject to the caveat that PCAOB reports for trien-
nially inspected auditors do not capture the going concern aspect
of audit quality. For annually inspected auditors, the results are
conﬂicting and suggest PCAOB inspection reports do not distin-
guish audit quality during the period inspected for annually
inspected auditors.
Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction
We examine whether PCAOB inspections are able to distinguish audit quality during the period in-
spected by examining the association between several outcome-based measures of audit quality and
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PCAOB inspection results. In response to high-proﬁle corporate governance failures, the U.S. Congress
concluded in 2002 that American Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants (AICPAs) peer review for
public company auditors was ineffective as an oversight mechanism. As a consequence, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was created by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) to over-
see the auditing industry. Understanding the PCAOB inspection process is important given such a
major shift in the regulatory framework of accounting ﬁrms.
The PCAOB has four core program areas: registration, inspections, standard setting, and enforce-
ment. Within the four areas, inspections represent the central feature of the accounting profession’s
shift from self-regulation to independent regulation (DeFond, 2010). Registered public accounting
ﬁrms that issue audit reports for more than 100 public companies are subject to annual inspections
by the PCAOB, and those with 100 or less are subject to triennial inspections. Even though inspec-
tions are central to the PCAOB, some prior research ﬁnds that inspection reports are uninformative
to clients in terms of auditor choice (Lennox and Pittman, 2010). However, Abbott et al. (2012) ﬁnd
that for triennially inspected auditors the informativeness of the PCAOB inspection report (in terms
of auditor choice) depends on the severity of the report, agency costs, and audit committee
effectiveness.
In this paper, we examine whether PCAOB inspection reports are associated with audit quality.
Whether PCAOB reports are informative to stakeholders or whether they are associated with audit
quality are two distinct questions. The informativeness of reports to stakeholders, like clients and
audit committees, depends on whether inspection reports provide incremental information about
audit quality (e.g., the timeliness of PCAOB reports) and audit committee effectiveness. For example,
the PCAOB inspection reports could be associated with audit quality; however, the audit committee
could be inefﬁcient at incorporating all relevant information in the decision (Doty, 2011).
We expect PCAOB inspection results to be associated with audit quality because the PCAOB devotes
most of its resources to the inspection division and has unprecedented access to conﬁdential docu-
ments and clients during inspections. However, there are several reasons why PCAOB inspection re-
ports could lack an association with audit quality including their representativeness and content.
We expect representativeness to exacerbate the inability of PCAOB inspection reports to distinguish
audit quality during the period inspected for annually inspected auditors since the client base is large.
In addition, there is very little variation in the severity of the PCAOB inspection reports for annually
inspected auditors but there is signiﬁcant variation for triennially inspected auditors. As such, we
examine whether PCAOB inspection results are associated with audit quality and whether the relation
differs across triennially and annually inspected auditors.
Several studies examine the external monitoring mechanism under the PCAOB. DeFond and
Lennox (2011) study the registration program post-SOX and PCAOB and ﬁnd that small auditors exit
the market and their clients receive higher audit quality from the successor auditor. Carcello et al.
(2011) speciﬁcally investigate Big 4 auditors and ﬁnd that the PCAOB inspection led to an improve-
ment in audit quality (measured by abnormal accruals).2 These two studies examine general audit
quality surrounding the implementation of SOX and/or the PCAOB, whereas we focus on the direct link
between the PCAOB inspection report results and underlying audit quality of an auditor’s portfolio of
clients.3
We examine three client-speciﬁc measures of audit quality: abnormal current accruals, the pro-
pensity to restate, and the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern opinion. We partition the
PCAOB inspection results into three categories: clean, deﬁcient (if the PCAOB investigation discov-
ered any audit deﬁciency), and seriously deﬁcient (if the PCAOB investigation discovered an audit
2 Empirically, it might be challenging to differentiate audit quality improvements caused by the PCAOB versus other
confounding SOX provisions. This is because other confounding SOX provisions are expected to affect audit quality differently
across auditors; speciﬁcally, auditors with low audit quality may improve more after SOX because the consequence of audit failure
is more severe. Two examples of such confounding SOX provisions include Section 201 (auditors can no longer perform certain
non-audit services) and Section 301 (the audit committee must be independent).
3 Our paper is distinct from Carcello et al. (2011). First, our research question allows us to shed light on whether PCAOB
inspection results are able to distinguish audit quality during the period inspected, whereas Carcello et al. (2011) examine whether
Big 4 audit quality improves during the ﬁrst two rounds of PCAOB reports. Second, our sample is more comprehensive in that we
examine all auditors including triennially inspected auditors. Third, we employ multiple measures of actual audit quality.
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deﬁciency and indicated that the auditor failed to prevent a GAAP departure). We also distinguish
between annually inspected auditors and triennially inspected auditors because Church and
Shefchik (2012) ﬁnd that the nature and severity of audit deﬁciencies are similar for Big 4 and
national ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd that the clients of triennially inspected auditors are associated with lower audit quality if
the reports are seriously deﬁcient (weaker results for deﬁcient reports). Speciﬁcally, triennially in-
spected auditors receiving deﬁcient or seriously deﬁcient reports are associated with signiﬁcantly
higher abnormal current accruals and those receiving seriously deﬁcient reports are associated with
a greater propensity to restate. However, we ﬁnd no evidence that PCAOB inspection reports are asso-
ciated with the propensity to issue a going concern opinion. Among the annually inspected auditors,
the results are conﬂicting and suggest PCAOB inspection reports do not distinguish audit quality dur-
ing the period inspected.
We believe that examining whether PCAOB inspection reports are associated with actual audit
quality is important to better understand the impact of this regulation for several reasons. First,
PCAOB inspection results that provide information about audit quality can produce a positive and sus-
tainable effect on auditing ﬁrms’ incentives to pursue high quality.4 Second, besides improving actual
audit quality, the PCAOB is important for improving the public perception of audit quality (Francis,
2004). The fairness and credibility (i.e. ability to distinguish audit quality) of PCAOB inspection results
is helpful at augmenting public conﬁdence in ﬁnancial reports. Third, PCAOB inspection results are com-
municated to the SEC and relevant state regulatory authorities, and any deﬁciencies discovered during
the inspection may trigger PCAOB enforcement mechanisms such as investigations, hearings, sanctions
and potentially disciplinary action against the auditor. Given the prominent role that PCAOB inspection
results play as an input into other regulatory mechanisms, understanding the ability of the reports to dis-
tinguish audit quality during the period inspected is important.5
Our results on triennially inspected auditors contribute to the PCAOB literature in several ways.
First, our evidence suggests that small auditors with seriously deﬁcient PCAOB reports exhibit lower
audit quality (measured by discretionary accruals and restatement). The evidence provided herein is
important because it appears the PCAOB inspection report created heterogeneity in audit quality
among a group of auditors universally treated as one homogenous group known as ‘‘other’’ by prior
research. In addition, these results provide evidence that PCAOB inspection reports could possibly
be used as an auditor speciﬁc proxy of audit quality for triennially inspected auditors. However,
one caveat is that the inspection reports do not capture all aspects of audit quality; therefore, for re-
search designs focusing on the going concern aspects of audit quality, PCAOB reports for triennially
inspected auditors may not be suitable.
Second, our results are timely and relevant given that the PCAOB is debating whether to extend the
inspection program to auditors of broker-dealers such as the one that audited the ﬁnancial statements
of Bernie Madoff (Roybark, 2009) and foreign ﬁrms that wish to raise capital in the US such as Chinese
ﬁrms that are able to circumvent traditional listing requirements by undertaking a reverse merger
(PCAOB, 2011). Our results underscore regulatory arguments to expand the PCAOB inspection process
to include auditors of broker–dealers and foreign registrants as the vast majority of these auditors
would be categorized as triennially inspected for which our results show PCAOB inspections distin-
guish audit quality during the period inspected. Third, besides improving actual audit quality, the
PCAOB is important for improving the public perception of audit quality (Francis, 2004). Our results
show that triennially inspected PCAOB inspection reports are associated with audit quality (measured
as discretionary accruals and restatements) and this could improve perceived audit quality. Improving
4 Inspections that discriminate quality differences can help by: (1) motivating high audit quality choices; (2) educating low
quality auditors (with the inspection itself); and (3) restricting extremely low quality auditors with follow-up disciplinary actions
and sanctions.
5 In the short term, PCAOB inspections could enhance audit ﬁrms’ incentives to pursue high audit quality even if the inspection
results do not correspond with audit quality, as auditors may voluntarily choose higher quality given the uncertainty associated
with the new independent regulator. However, their incentives are different in the long term. If PCAOB inspection reports do not
distinguish audit quality, in the long term, audit ﬁrms will lose incentives to improve audit quality due to PCAOB inspections. In
the long term, auditing ﬁrms may still have incentives to improve audit quality due to reputation concerns but not due to
inspections.
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audit quality (perceived or actual) with respect to these auditors could be particularly important
because their clients tend to be smaller and riskier (in terms of leverage) than clients of annually
inspected auditors.
Lastly, for annually inspected auditors, we ﬁnd conﬂicting results, thus our evidence suggests that
PCAOB inspection reports are not suitable to use as an audit quality proxy for annually inspected
auditors.
2. Regulation of the accounting profession
2.1. AICPA peer review and creation of the PCAOB
Self-regulation of the accounting profession by the AICPA emerged in the 1970s after some high
proﬁle corporate bankruptcies and audit failures. Accounting ﬁrms that audited SEC reporting compa-
nies were required to join the Securities and Exchange Practice Section (SECPS) in order to retain
AICPA membership. One important requirement for SECPS membership was to undergo a peer review
every 3 years. Peer reviews mainly involve evaluating the quality control system along ﬁve dimen-
sions: (1) independence, (2) personnel management, (3) client acceptance, (4) engagement perfor-
mance and (5) monitoring.
SOX in 2002 created the PCAOB. Self-monitoring under the AICPA was largely replaced by exter-
nal monitoring under the PCAOB. The PCAOB is responsible for the regulation, registration, and
inspection of external auditors. Accounting ﬁrms, US-based or foreign, that issue audit reports for
any SEC-reporting company, or substantially participate in the audit, must be registered with the
PCAOB. Registered public accounting ﬁrms that issue audit reports for more than 100 public com-
panies are subject to annual inspections by the PCAOB, and those with 100 or less are subject to tri-
ennial inspections. Also, the PCAOB has the authority to conduct unannounced inspections in special
situations.
2.2. The PCAOB inspection process
The PCAOB inspections include reviewing portions of selected audit engagements performed in the
prior year.6 The PCAOB inspectors adopt a risk-based approach and select engagements and aspects of
those engagements for inspection based on an internally developed risk model. Because their approach
focuses on engagements (and aspects of the engagement) where the risk of audit failure is high, if no
deﬁciencies are discovered then it speaks favorably of the auditor’s overall quality. The PCAOB Annual
Report (2007, p. 9) states:
‘‘Engagements, as well as the speciﬁc portions of engagements reviewed, are selected for inspection
primarily based on an assessment of the risk of material misstatements or signiﬁcant auditing deﬁ-
ciencies, as well as other ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks. The PCAOB’s Ofﬁce of Research and Analysis (ORA)
plays an important role in assisting PCAOB inspectors in selecting audit engagements and identi-
fying the risk areas within each engagement that might be reviewed.’’
The PCAOB inspections mainly involve: (1) evaluating the quality of the audit work performed on a
speciﬁc audit engagement; and (2) reviewing the auditor’s quality control system (this review ad-
dresses practices, policies and procedures concerning audit performance, training, compliance with
independence standards, client acceptance and retention, and the establishment of policies and pro-
cedures). Any audit deﬁciencies related to (1) are disclosed in the PCAOB inspection report (although
the client identity is conﬁdential); however, defects related to (2) are discussed in the nonpublic por-
tion of this report and will remain nonpublic unless the auditor fails to address them to the Board’s
satisfaction within 12 months.
6 The PCAOB Annual Report (2005, p. 8) states: ‘‘In 2005, PCAOB inspectors reviewed portions of more than 365 audits
performed by the largest nine ﬁrms and 623 audits performed by 272 smaller ﬁrms.’’ Please note that the 895 (623 + 365)
inspections are client-level, whereas PCAOB inspection results are auditor-level.
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3. Hypothesis section
The PCAOB devotes most of its resources to the inspection division and the inspection team is the
single largest group of employees at the PCAOB, therefore we expect PCAOB inspection results to be
associated with audit quality.7 The scope of PCAOB inspection process is broad due to unprecedented
powers of enforcement and access to conﬁdential documents and clients. It can conduct investigations,
conduct disciplinary proceedings, impose sanctions, and can communicate inspection results to regula-
tory and law enforcement agencies.8 The PCAOB may access all client documentation (even when clients’
documents expressly prohibit their auditors from disclosing them) and interview clients’ audit commit-
tee members and directors (Grunfeld, 2004). In addition, the PCAOB inspections are conducted by expe-
rienced and independent accountants. On average, large ﬁrm inspection teams had 23 years of
experience, while the remaining inspection teams averaged more than 14 years of relevant experience
(PCAOB Annual Report, 2005). Also, the inspections are independent because (i) the inspectors no longer
have ties to the accounting industry; (ii) the audit engagements and the aspects of the audit investigated
by the PCAOB are selected according to the Board’s criteria and the auditor is not allowed an opportunity
to limit or inﬂuence the selection process.
Alternatively, the PCAOB inspection reports could lack the ability to distinguish audit quality for
several reasons. First, an audit deﬁciency reported in the inspection report may not be representative
of the auditor’s overall audit quality because the PCAOB uses a risk-based approach and does not in-
spect every engagement. DeFond (2010, p. 9) suggests that one potential consequence of targeting ris-
ky clients (and aspects of the engagement) is that ‘‘the weaknesses reported in the PCAOB Inspections
are unlikely to be representative of the auditor’s client base or the average audit quality provided by
the auditors.’’ To the extent the client chosen using the risk based approach deviates marginally from
the auditor’s overall client base, we would expect a noisy relation between reports and audit quality.
However, to the extent the client chosen deviates signiﬁcantly from the auditor’s overall client base
(i.e. an outlier), then we could ﬁnd a lack of relation.
Second, PCAOB inspection reports could lack the ability to distinguish audit quality due to the con-
tent of the inspection report. The nonpublic portion of the report contains information regarding the
quality controls of the auditor. For example, with respect to partner compensation, the PCAOB states
that the objectives include ‘‘assessing whether the design of the measurement, evaluation, and com-
pensation processes as documented and communicated could be expected to achieve the objective of
promoting audit quality.’’ The quality controls evaluated by the PCAOB, which are nonpublic, relate to
the auditors’ overall audit quality and prior literature suggests not disclosing quality control issues as
a possible reason for why clients do not react to the PCAOB inspection reports (Lennox and Pittman,
2010). The quality control issues of an auditor have broad effects on all audits conducted by the audi-
tor, whereas the implications of speciﬁc engagement deﬁciencies, which are publicly disclosed, could
more narrowly relate to a particular client. Therefore, PCAOB inspection reports, without content from
the nonpublic portion, could lack an association with audit quality if the quality control section pro-
vides signiﬁcant information about the auditors’ overall audit quality that the public portion does not
capture.
Third, the PCAOB inspection results might not be associated with audit quality given the consider-
able challenges faced by the PCAOB for committing enough qualiﬁed resources for timely inspections
of all registered ﬁrms (Goelzer, 2005). Some question whether PCAOB inspectors have the technical
expertise to effectively regulate audit ﬁrms (Lennox and Pittman, 2010; Wallison, 2005). Lack of tech-
nical expertise could lead to a lack of relation between reports and audit quality. Also, in an effort to
save time and money for the PCAOB and the ﬁrm, many inspections of triennial ﬁrms are conducted as
‘‘desk reviews’’ whereby the PCAOB inspection team obtains the working papers and reviews the audit
7 According to the 2010 PCAOB budget, $87,029,000 ($929,000 for registration and $87,029,000 for inspections) was budgeted
for the Division of Registration and Inspections while only $14,962,000 was budgeted for the Division of Enforcement and
Investigations.
8 As of 2/27/2012 the PCAOB has 42 settled disciplinary orders and imposed sanctions ranging from requiring the auditor to
provide additional disclosures to prohibiting the auditor from auditing publicly traded companies (i.e., registration with the PCAOB
is revoked).
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at the Board’s ofﬁces. We argue that these challenges could lead to a lack of relation between PCAOB
inspection reports and audit quality.
Fourth, inspectors may include trivial or inconsequential weaknesses in the PCAOB inspection re-
port that could lead to no association between PCAOB inspection reports and audit quality. For exam-
ple, DeFond (2010, p. 10) refers to a common criticism of PCAOB inspections, noting that ‘‘they are too
detail-oriented and as a result tend to identify trivial and inconsequential audit weaknesses’’ as a re-
sult of inspectors that are ‘‘under pressure to identify and report weaknesses.’’ To the extent PCAOB
inspection reports include trivial or inconsequential weaknesses, we could ﬁnd a lack of relation be-
tween inspection reports and audit quality. We expect the identiﬁcation of trivial weaknesses to affect
deﬁcient reports and not seriously deﬁcient reports. These arguments lead to our ﬁrst hypothesis for
triennially inspected auditors.
Hypothesis One. Audit quality is lower for triennially inspected auditors receiving a seriously
deﬁcient (deﬁcient) report from the PCAOB than for auditors receiving a clean report.
The lack of representativeness of PCAOB inspection results could be particularly severe for account-
ing ﬁrms with a large number of clients. Since the client base of annually inspected auditors is large
and diverse, the likelihood that the clients chosen by the PCAOB to inspect is representative of the
auditor’s overall client base is relatively smaller. In addition, there is very little variation in the severity
of the PCAOB inspection reports for annually inspected auditors. Through 2010, no annually inspected
auditor has received a clean report and every Big 4 auditor has received a seriously deﬁcient report. As
such, we include a separate hypothesis for annually inspected auditors. Although, we expect PCAOB
inspection reports to have no association with audit quality for annually inspected auditors, we state
hypothesis two in the following form to be consistent with hypothesis one:
Hypothesis Two. Audit quality is lower for annually inspected auditors receiving a seriously deﬁcient
(deﬁcient) report from the PCAOB than for auditors receiving a clean report.
4. Data and research method
4.1. Sample
We obtain all inspection reports from the PCAOB website from 1/31/2005 to 12/31/2009 for both
the triennially inspected and annually inspected auditors. We end in 12/31/2009 because our regres-
sion using the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern opinion as a measure of audit quality re-
quires information in t + 1. From each report we obtain auditor name, dates when the ﬁeld work was
conducted, whether there was an audit deﬁciency, and, if so, the particular type of deﬁciency. The
inspection report describes the deﬁciencies discovered during the inspection; however the corre-
sponding clients’ names are not identiﬁed. The reports from the PCAOB are auditor-speciﬁc rather
than client-speciﬁc.
We identify each auditor’s clients using the Audit Analytics database. Then, we match every client
to Compustat to get the necessary information to estimate the audit quality measures and control
variables. For each client, we obtain the necessary information from Compustat for the most recent
ﬁscal year before the inspection dates. For example, if the inspection dates are during June 2006, then
the statements inspected by the PCAOB would be those ﬁled for the year ending December 2005
(assuming a December ﬁscal year end).9
Table 1 provides details on the type and frequency of report results issued by the PCAOB. Of the 527
PCAOB inspection reports, 249 reveal no audit deﬁciencies so we classify these as clean; and 278 re-
veal one or more audit deﬁciencies so we classify these as deﬁcient. We further partition based on the
type of deﬁciency stated in the PCOAB inspection report. If the inspection report mentions that the
9 An associate director of inspections for the PCAOB conﬁrmed that PCAOB inspectors examine the most recently ﬁled ﬁnancial
statements during the inspection process.
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deﬁciency directly relates to the auditors ‘‘failure to identify a departure from GAAP’’ and/or that a
particular deﬁciency resulted in a ‘‘restatement’’ of the ﬁnancial statements, we classify these reports
as seriously deﬁcient. Among the 278 deﬁcient reports, 100 are also classiﬁed as seriously deﬁcient.
We consider seriously deﬁcient reports to be more severe than deﬁcient reports because the report
directly refers to outright audit failure (Francis, 2004) and a breach in the traditional deﬁnition of
audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981). The seriously deﬁcient report always has a direct ﬁnancial reporting
implication which often appears to be severe,10 whereas the deﬁcient report, such as failure to perform
and document sufﬁcient substantive procedures, is less severe because the implications for ﬁnancial
reporting are not as apparent. A lead investigator for a major ofﬁce of the PCAOB stated that the language
‘‘departure from GAAP’’ is used to indicate a more serious deﬁciency relative to a report that does not
contain that phrase. Thus, we would expect the association between audit quality and seriously deﬁcient
(versus deﬁcient) inspection results to be more salient. Appendix A includes examples of deﬁcient and
seriously deﬁcient reports.
Interestingly, during our sample period, none of the annually inspected accounting ﬁrms have re-
ceived a clean report from the PCAOB. Every Big 4 auditor (Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young,
KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers) has received a seriously deﬁcient PCAOB inspection report and every
national auditor (BDO Seidman, Grant Thornton, McGladrey or Crowe Chizek) has received either a
seriously deﬁcient or deﬁcient PCAOB inspection report.
4.2. Research method
Our objective is to examine the association between the inspection report results and audit quality.
We examine three measures of audit quality used in the prior literature. Our ﬁrst measure of audit
Table 1
Types and classiﬁcation of PCAOB inspection reports.
Panel A: Types of reports (ﬁled between 1/1/2005-12/31/2009)
No audit deﬁciency 249
Audit deﬁciency alone 178
Audit and serious deﬁciency 100
Total # of PCAOB inspection reports 527
Panel B: Classiﬁcation of deﬁcient and seriously deﬁcient
Clean 249
Deﬁcient 278
includes audit (178) and serious (100) deﬁciencies
Seriously deﬁcient 100
includes serious (100) deﬁciencies
Notes: The sample consists of 527 inspection reports on the PCAOB website from
1/1/2005 to 12/31/2009. Each PCAOB report indicates whether or not the
inspection revealed a deﬁciency with respect to a particular auditor. We classify
a report as clean if the report indicates that the PCAOB did not identify any audit
deﬁciencies during the inspection. We classify a report as Deﬁcient if the report
indicates that the PCAOB identiﬁed an audit deﬁciency during the inspection.
We classify a report as Seriously Deﬁcient if the report indicates that the PCAOB
identiﬁed an audit deﬁciency during the inspection that directly relates to an
auditors ‘‘failure to identify a departure from GAAP’’ and/or that a particular
deﬁciency resulted in a ‘‘restatement’’ of the ﬁnancial statements. The PCAOB
examines the most recently ﬁled ﬁnancial statements during the inspection
process, therefore there is a time lag between the date of inspection and the date
of the inspected ﬁnancial report. For example, if the inspection dates are during
June 2006, then the most recently ﬁled ﬁnancial statements and the ones
inspected by the PCAOB would be those ﬁled for year ending December 2005
(assuming a December ﬁscal year end).
10 For example, the BDO Seidman PCAOB inspection report (11/30/2006), states that ‘‘the Firm failed to identify a departure from
GAAP’’ which lead to an overstatement of 12 percent of the client’s pre-tax earnings.
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quality is the amount of abnormal current accruals; the second is the likelihood of companies to have
restatements; and the third is the auditor’s likelihood to issue a going concern opinion for distressed
companies.11 For abnormal accruals, we employ the model used by Ashbaugh et al. (2003). We follow
Burns and Kedia (2006) for the restatement analysis, and DeFond et al. (2002) for the going concern
analysis.
5. Abnormal current accruals
5.1. Empirical model
We examine the relation between abnormal current accruals and inspection report results to pro-
vide evidence on whether auditors identiﬁed as deﬁcient by the PCAOB allow their clients to engage in
more aggressive accrual management. Prior research suggests that managers have the most discretion
over abnormal current accruals (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Ashbaugh et al., 2003) and Kothari et al.
(2005) ﬁnd that discretionary accrual estimates are correlated with company performance. Therefore,
we use a measure of performance-adjusted current accruals in our analysis.
To estimate abnormal performance-adjusted current accruals (PCA), we perform the following
cross-sectional regressions for each two-digit SIC code containing at least 15 companies in each year
for the entire population of Compustat companies:
CAj;t=Aj;t1 ¼ c1  1=Aj;t1 þ c2  ðDREVj;tÞ=Aj;t1 þ c3  ROAt1 þ tj;t ðaÞ
ECAj;t=Aj;t1 ¼ estðc1Þ  1=Aj;t1 þ estðc2Þ  ðDREVj;t  DARj;tÞ=Aj;t1 þ estðc3Þ  ROAt1 ðbÞ
CA is the net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization minus operating
cash ﬂows (Hribar and Collins, 2002); A the total assets; DREV the net sales in year t less net sales in
year t  1; DAR the accounts receivable in year t less accounts receivable in year t  1 and ROA the
return on assets.
We use the industry-year speciﬁc parameter estimates from (a) to estimate expected current
accruals (ECA) using model (b). Our measure of abnormal current accruals controlling for performance
(PCA) is equal to CAj,t/Aj,t1 minus ECAj,t/Aj,t1. Consistent with prior literature (Ashbaugh et al., 2003;
Lai and Gul, 2008), we estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model:
PCAt ¼ c0 þ c1Deficientt þ c2SeriouslyDeficientt þ c3Accrualt1 þ c4LnMVt þ c5Mergert
þ c6Financet þ c7LEVt þ c8BTMt þ c9LITt þ c10LOSSt þ c11CFOt þ c12Inst Holdingt1
þ c13Deficientt  Annualþ c14SeriouslyDeficientt  Annualþ et ð1Þ
PCA is the value of abnormal current accruals controlling for performance, Deﬁcient = 1 if the com-
pany’s auditor receives an audit deﬁciency from the PCAOB based on investigating year t ﬁnancial
statements, zero otherwise, SeriouslyDeﬁcient = 1 if the company’s auditor receives an audit deﬁ-
ciency that indicates a departure from GAAP that may (if material) result in a restatement of the ﬁnan-
cial statements from the PCAOB based on investigating year t ﬁnancial statements, zero otherwise,
Accrual the net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization minus operat-
ing cash ﬂows divided by lagged total assets, LnMV the natural logarithm of the market value of equity
(in millions), Merger = 1 if the ﬁrm has engaged in a merger or acquisition, zero otherwise, Finance = 1
if merger is not equal to 1 and the number of shares outstanding increased by at least 10%, or long-
term debt increased by at least 20%, or the ﬁrm ﬁrst appeared on the CRSP monthly returns database
in year t, zero otherwise, LEV the total assets minus book value divided by total assets, BTM the book
11 We do not use the propensity to just meet the analyst forecast because there are limitations to using it as a measure of audit
quality. First, our sample of clients of triennially inspected auditors are mostly smaller companies without analyst following,
therefore requiring analyst forecasts would signiﬁcantly reduce the sample. Second, managers can use real activities manipulation
(Roychowdhury, 2006) or expectations management to meet the analyst forecast, both of which are not monitored by the auditor.
Therefore, the propensity to just meet the analyst forecast could partially capture real or expectation management instead of poor
audit quality. Third, companies’ target earnings (I/B/E/S actual) is different from GAAP earnings (Doyle et al. 2003); therefore, to a
certain extent, whether the client meets the analysts expectation is beyond the control of the auditor.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics and correlation between variables used in the discretionary current accruals model.
Triennially inspected auditors Annually inspected auditors
Audit deﬁciency alone
(n = 796)
Audit and serious
deﬁciency (n = 204)
Clean (n = 746) Audit deﬁciency alone
(n = 515)
Audit and serious
deﬁciency (n = 17,399)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
PCA 3.98*** 0.43*** 4.54*** 0.35 1.28 0.29 0.30 0.03 0.14 0.02
Accrualt1 0.46*** 0.11*** 0.47*** 0.11** 0.30 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05
LnMV 2.87*** 2.75*** 2.82** 2.73*** 3.12 3.04 4.54 4.45 6.16 6.14
Merger 0.13 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.38 0.00
Finance 0.29 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.30 0.00
LEV 1.38*** 0.62*** 1.45*** 0.66*** 1.04 0.49 0.54 0.44 0.50 0.47
BTM 0.07*** 0.19*** 0.07** 0.18*** 0.24 0.29 0.50 0.41 0.45 0.39
LIT 0.26 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.32 0.00
LOSS 0.70 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.66 1.00 0.49 0.00 0.34 0.00
CFO 0.46*** 0.12*** 0.38* 0.07 0.29 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.07
Inst_Holding 0.06 0.00 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.06 0.00 0.34 0.30 0.49 0.51
Deﬁcient SeriouslyDeﬁcient PCA Accrualt1 LnMV Merger Finance LEV BTM LIT LOSS CFO
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix
SeriouslyDeﬁcient 0.58***
PCA 0.06*** 0.15***
Accrualt1 0.12*** 0.22*** 0.26***
LnMV 0.25*** 0.38*** 0.21*** 0.24***
Merger 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.10** 0.32***
Finance 0.01 0.00 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.48***
LEV 0.13*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.46*** 0.26*** 0.08*** 0.02***
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BTM 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.24*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.50***
LIT 0.01 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.05***
LOSS 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.46*** 0.23*** 0.07*** 0.20*** 0.11*** 0.15***
CFO 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.19*** 0.05*** 0.53*** 0.24*** 0.12*** 0.46***
Inst_Holding 0.22*** 0.31*** 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.54*** 0.27*** 0.07*** 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.02*** 0.33*** 0.31***
Notes: The sample consists of 344 auditors (19,660 observations). All variables are measured at the end of ﬁscal year t unless noted otherwise. Deﬁcient is 1 if the company’s auditor
receives a deﬁcient report based on investigating year t ﬁnancial statements, zero otherwise. SeriouslyDeﬁcient is 1 if the company’s auditor receives a Seriously Deﬁcient report based on
investigating year t ﬁnancial statements, zero otherwise. PCA is the value of abnormal current accruals, controlling for performance. Accrual is equal to net income before extraordinary
items plus depreciation and amortization minus operating cash ﬂows divided by lagged total assets. LnMV is equal to the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (in millions).
Merger is 1 if the ﬁrm has engaged in a merger or acquisition, zero otherwise. Finance is 1 if Merger is not equal to 1 and number of shares outstanding increased by at least 10%, or long-
term debt increased by at least 20%, or the ﬁrm ﬁrst appeared on the CRSP monthly returns database in year t, zero otherwise. LEV is total assets minus book value of equity divided by total
assets. BTM is book value of equity divided by market value of equity. LIT is 1 if the ﬁrm operates in a high-litigation industry, zero otherwise (high-litigation industries are industries with
SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370–7370). LOSS is 1 if the company reports a loss, zero otherwise. CFO is cash ﬂow from operating activities divided by
total assets. Inst_Holding is the percentage of shares held by institutional owners at the beginning of year t. In panel A, the p-values represent differences between triennially inspected
auditors with a deﬁcient or seriously deﬁcient report compared to auditors with a clean report. The p-values for the statistical signiﬁcance of differences between the mean values are
calculated using the paired t-test (Hogg and Tanis, 2001). The p-values for the statistical signiﬁcance of differences between the median values are calculated using the non-parametric
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. All variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% levels two-tailed.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% levels two-tailed.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% levels two-tailed.
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value divided by market value of equity, LIT = 1 if the ﬁrm operates in a high-litigation industry, zero
otherwise (high-litigation industries are industries with SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–
3674, 5200–5961, and 7370–7370), LOSS = 1 if the company reports a loss, zero otherwise, CFO the
cash ﬂow from operating activities divided by total assets, Inst_Holding the percentage of shares held
by institutional owners and Annual = 1 if the auditor is inspected annually (Deloitte and Touche, Ernst
and Young, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, BDO Seidman, Grant Thornton, McGladrey or Crowe Chi-
zek), zero otherwise.
Since observations for the same client are not independent, we compute p-values that allow for
heteroskedasticity and any type of correlation for observations of the same client (Petersen, 2009).
We include year ﬁxed effects in Model (1). Consistent with Fields et al. (2004), utilities and ﬁnancial
institutions are excluded because they operate in highly regulated industries with accounting rules
that differ from those in other industries. We include several control variables to control for the deter-
minants of PCA. We include size (LnMV) because large companies tend to have more stable accruals
(Dechow and Dichev, 2002). We include CFO because, on average, accruals and cash ﬂows are nega-
tively correlated (Dechow, 1994) and it is a proxy for performance (Kothari et al., 2005). We include
variables that proxy for the ability and incentives of the company to engage in accruals management.
Companies that are near debt constraints may have greater incentives to manage earnings (e.g.,
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Becker et al., 1998); therefore, we include leverage (LEV). It may be
the case that companies with different underlying characteristics choose different types of auditors;
these variables attempt to control for those differences. We include two interaction variables
Deﬁcientt  Annual and SeriouslyDeﬁcientt  Annual, to capture the difference in audit quality
between annually and triennially inspected auditors. Since none of the Big 4 or national auditors
receive a clean PCAOB inspection report over our sample period, we do not include an indicator
variable for Annual in addition to the interaction variables.
5.2. Empirical results
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation coefﬁcients for PCA and the control vari-
ables used in model (1). The univariate statistics are presented for the triennially inspected and annu-
ally inspected samples separately. For the triennially inspected sample, PCA is signiﬁcantly higher for
both the deﬁcient (mean = 3.98) and seriously deﬁcient (mean = 4.54) samples compared to the clean
sample (mean = 1.28). For the annually inspected sample, mean PCA is 0.30 for clients employing an
auditor that receives an audit deﬁciency versus 0.14 for clients employing an auditor that receives a
seriously deﬁcient report. Mean and median PCA is signiﬁcantly lower for clients of annually inspected
auditors compared to clients of triennially inspected auditors receiving an audit deﬁciency, serious
deﬁciency, or clean PCAOB inspection report (untabulated). Several of the control variables are
signiﬁcantly different, indicating the need to control for these variables in the subsequent regressions.
Table 2, Panel B reports the correlations for the variables used in model (1).
The results of estimating model (1) are reported in Table 3 for the ‘‘Triennially Inspected Auditors’’
(column 1) and ‘‘All Auditors’’ (column 2) samples, separately. The regression includes both Deﬁcient
and SeriouslyDeﬁcient; therefore, the coefﬁcient on SeriouslyDeﬁcient captures the incremental asso-
ciation of having a seriously deﬁcient report in addition to a deﬁcient report. We believe the results
presented for the triennially inspected auditors sample allow for clearer inferences related to c1, c2
and c1 + c2 than the all auditors sample, therefore our in-text discussion focuses on column 1 when
discussing the results of model (1)–(3).12 For the triennially inspected auditors sample, c1 is signiﬁ-
cantly positive, 2.24 (p = 0.07) implying that clients employing a deﬁcient auditor are associated with
12 The reason that c1and c2 in column one and column two are not comparable is that in column two the intercept and
coefﬁcients for control variables are forced to be the same for clients of both annually and triennially inspected auditors. The
intercept is forced to be same for a technical reason because no annually inspected auditor ever receives a clean PCAOB report.
Forcing the same coefﬁcients on control variables is an issue because the all auditors sample is dominated by the clients of
annually inspected auditors (only 9% of the observations are clients of triennially inspected auditors) and the clients of the
triennially inspected auditors have signiﬁcantly different characteristics (smaller, higher leverage etc.) than clients of annually
inspected auditors.
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Table 3
Regression of signed abnormal performance adjusted current accruals on PCAOB inspection results and controls.
Triennially inspected auditors (1) All auditors (2)
Panel A: PCA = c0 + c1Deﬁcient + c2SeriouslyDeﬁcient + c13Deﬁcient  Annual + c14SeriouslyDeﬁcient  Annual + X  Control
Intercept 3.278 1.363***
(0.18) (0.00)
Deﬁcientt 2.241* 1.374***
(0.07) (0.00)
SeriouslyDeﬁcientt 3.614* 0.892
(0.09) (0.29)
Accrualt1 0.654** 2.060***
(0.02) (<.0001)
LnMVt 0.036 0.129***
(0.93) (<.0001)
Mergert 1.897 0.016
(0.18) (0.85)
Financet 0.892 0.017
(0.49) (0.86)
LEVt 0.048 0.352**
(0.63) (0.03)
BTMt 0.577** 0.020
(0.04) (0.83)
LITt 1.436 0.209**
(0.21) (0.02)
LOSSt 5.306*** 0.508***
(0.00) (<.0001)
CFOt 0.319 2.423***
(0.51) (<.0001)
Inst_Holdingt 5.803*** 0.079
(0.01) (0.43)
Deﬁcientt  Annualt 1.990***
(<.0001)
SeriouslyDeﬁcientt  Annualt 0.814
(0.35)
Year Effects YES YES
No. of Observations 1746 19,660
No. of Firms (clusters) 1304 5775
R2 0.099 0.133
Value of (c1 + c2) 5.855 2.266
F-test for (c1 + c2) = 0 8.45** 13.82***
Coefﬁcient F test
Panel B: Additional tests
Seriously deﬁcient annual vs. deﬁcient annual: (c2 + c14) 0.078 0.17
Deﬁcient annual auditors versus:
Clean triennial: (c1 + c13) 0.617 2.81*
Deﬁcient triennial: (c13) 1.990 36.57***
Seriously deﬁcient triennial: (c13 – c2) 2.882 13.81***
Seriously deﬁcient annual auditors versus:
Clean triennial: (c1 + c2 + c13 + c14) 0.538 6.16***
Deﬁcient triennial: (c2 + c13 + c14) 1.912 25.18***
Seriously deﬁcient triennial: (c13 + c14) 2.804 13.71***
Notes: The all auditors sample consists of 344 auditors (19,660 observations). All variables are measured at the end of ﬁscal year
t unless noted otherwise. Year ﬁxed effects are included. The p-values in parentheses are two-tailed and allow heteroskedas-
ticity and any type of correlations for observations of the ﬁrm but assume independence for observations across different ﬁrms.
Deﬁcient is 1 if the company’s auditor receives a Deﬁcient report from the PCAOB based on investigating year t ﬁnancial
statements, zero otherwise. SeriouslyDeﬁcient is 1 if the company’s auditor receives a Seriously Deﬁcient report from the
PCAOB based on investigating year t ﬁnancial statements, zero otherwise. PCA is the value of abnormal current accruals,
controlling for performance. Accrual is equal to net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization
minus operating cash ﬂows divided by lagged total assets. LnMV is equal to the natural logarithm of the market value of equity
(in millions). Merger is 1 if the ﬁrm has engaged in a merger or acquisition, zero otherwise. Finance is 1 if Merger is not equal to
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signiﬁcantly more abnormal current accruals than clients employing a clean auditor. In addition,
(c1 + c2) is signiﬁcantly positive with value of 5.86 and signiﬁcant at a 5% level which suggests that cli-
ents of seriously deﬁcient report auditors have signiﬁcantly more abnormal current accruals relative to
clients of an auditor receiving a clean report.
For the all auditors sample, c1 is signiﬁcantly positive and c2 is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Since no annually inspected auditor receives a clean PCAOB inspection report, we cannot use annually
inspected auditors that receive a clean report as the control group. Therefore, we include additional
tests in Panel B using other control groups. First, we test the incremental difference between seriously
deﬁcient and deﬁcient PCAOB reports for annually inspected auditors and we ﬁnd that the F-test for
(c2 + c14) = 0 is insigniﬁcant which is inconsistent with hypothesis two. Second, we statistically test
difference between annually inspected auditors and triennially inspected auditors across all types
of PCAOB inspection results. The additional tests suggest that both deﬁcient and seriously deﬁcient
annually inspected clients have lower discretionary accruals compared to triennially inspected audi-
tors, regardless of the type of PCAOB inspection report (clean, deﬁcient, and seriously deﬁcient).
Overall, the results provide support for hypothesis one and no support for hypothesis two. It ap-
pears PCAOB inspection reports distinguish audit quality for triennially inspected auditors but not
for annually inspected auditors. Even though annually inspected auditors receive no clean reports,
they exhibit higher audit quality (measured by abnormal accruals) than those triennially inspected
auditors with the best PCAOB reports (i.e. clean). These results are consistent with prior literature that
larger auditors are in general of higher audit quality than small auditors. Except for LOSS and LEV, the
control variables with signiﬁcant coefﬁcients are consistent with Ashbaugh et al. (2003). In the all
auditors sample, LEV is signiﬁcantly positive consistent with the prediction that ﬁrms near their debt
covenants will engage in more income increasing accruals. LOSS is signiﬁcantly positive suggesting
that ﬁrms with negative earnings engage in more income increasing accruals.
5.3. Sensitivity analysis
As a sensitivity check, we estimate current accruals using the Kothari et al. (2005) approach which
includes sales changes net of the change in accounts receivable in both parameter estimations and dis-
cretionary accruals estimations. The results are qualitatively similar.13
6. Restatements
6.1. Empirical model
In this section, we examine whether auditors receiving a seriously deﬁcient (deﬁcient) report from
the PCAOB inspections process are associated with a higher restatement propensities. Current accruals
are intended to capture managers’ ﬂexibility within GAAP, while restatements capture a particularly
1 and number of shares outstanding increased by at least 10%, or long-term debt increased by at least 20%, or the ﬁrm ﬁrst
appeared on the CRSP monthly returns database in year t, zero otherwise. LEV is total assets minus book value of equity divided
by total assets. BTM is book value of equity divided by market value of equity. LIT is 1 if the ﬁrm operates in a high-litigation
industry, zero otherwise (high-litigation industries are industries with SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–
5961, and 7370–7370). LOSS is 1 if the company reports a loss, zero otherwise. CFO is cash ﬂow from operating activities divided
by total assets. Inst_Holding is the percentage of shares held by institutional owners at the beginning of year t. Annual is 1 if the
auditor is annually inspected by the PCAOB, zero otherwise. All variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% levels two-tailed.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% levels two-tailed.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% levels two-tailed.
13 In addition, we estimate model (1) using unsigned abnormal current accruals following Hribar and Nichols (2007).
Untabulated results reveal that our variables of interest (Deﬁcient and SeriouslyDeﬁcient) are not signiﬁcantly different from zero
in either sample. Signed abnormal current accruals are more appropriate as an audit quality proxy because prior literature suggests
auditors are more concerned with constraining income-increasing accruals (Becker et al., 1998; Barron et al., 2001; Nelson et al.,
2002).
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severe form of earnings management whereby ﬁnancial statements were not presented in accordance
with GAAP.
We obtain all restatements from Audit Analytics for our sample of ﬁrms.14 Following Burns and
Kedia (2006), we estimate the following logistic model:
RESTATEt ¼ c0 þ c1Deficientt þ c2SeriouslyDeficientt þ c3LnMVt1 þ c4BTMt1
þ c5LEVt1 þ c6INDt þ c7Deficientt  Annualþ c8SeriouslyDeficientt
 Annualþ et ð2Þ
RESTATE is the 1 if the company year (year t) is a misreporting year resulting in a restatement, zero
otherwise and IND the 1 if the company in two-digit SIC industries 35, 36, 38, and 73, otherwise, zero
otherwise All other variables as previously deﬁned for Eq. (1).
Following Burns and Kedia (2006) we exclude utilities and ﬁnancial institutions and include LnMV,
BTM, LEV and IND and include year ﬁxed effects. LnMV controls for any size effects and LEV controls
for companies near debt constraints. BTM controls for growth companies which may have increased
incentives to manage earnings. IND is an industry indicator variable that takes the value of one if the
ﬁrm belongs to two-digit SIC industries 35, 36, 38, and 73 because these industries may be correlated
with the incidence of aggressive accounting practices.
Given that the deﬁnition of a seriously deﬁcient report includes whether the PCAOB report indi-
cates a ‘‘failure to identify a departure from GAAP’’ that may result in a restatement, one may believe
that the relationship between seriously deﬁcient and restatement could be mechanical. We believe
that it is not mechanical because not every auditor–client engagement is inspected by the PCAOB un-
der the risk-based approach; thus, our analysis attempts to understand whether a seriously deﬁcient
inspection result formed by selected auditor–client engagements generalizes to auditors’ entire port-
folio of clients. Second, whether a ﬁrm is required to restate their ﬁnancial statement is ultimately
determined by the SEC not the PCAOB, as the PCAOB states in its report ‘‘When it comes to the Board’s
attention that an issuer’s ﬁnancial statements appear not to present fairly, in a material respect, the
ﬁnancial position, results of operations or cash ﬂows of the issuer in conformity with GAAP, the Board
reports that information to the SEC, which has jurisdiction to determine proper accounting in issuers’
ﬁnancial statements’’.15
6.2. Empirical results
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation for RESTATE and the control variables used
in model (2). The univariate statistics are presented for the triennially and annually inspected samples
separately. For the triennially inspected sample, RESTATE is signiﬁcantly higher for the seriously deﬁ-
cient sample (mean = 0.26) compared to the clean sample (mean = 0.20). For the annually inspected
sample, mean Restate is 0.10 for deﬁcient sample versus 0.19 for seriously deﬁcient sample. Several
of the control variables are signiﬁcantly different, indicating the need to control for these variables in
the subsequent regressions. Table 4, Panel B reports the correlations for the variables used inmodel (2).
The results of estimating model (2) are reported in Table 5. For the triennially inspected auditors
sample, the incremental association captured by c2 is signiﬁcantly positive (p-value = 0.07), even
though c1 is not signiﬁcantly different from zero. In addition, we ﬁnd that (c1 + c2) is signiﬁcantly po-
sitive with a value of 0.397 (p-value = 0.03). Our results suggest auditors receiving a seriously deﬁcient
report have lower audit quality in terms of the propensity to restate relative to auditors receiving a
deﬁcient or clean PCAOB inspection report providing support for hypothesis one. In terms of economic
signiﬁcance, for the triennially inspected sample, evaluating the control variables at their mean, we
14 Since our sample requires restatement information up to 2009, it may be the case that a potential restatement during that time
has not been identiﬁed yet. As a result, we may classify some companies as not having a misreporting year when they do. This type
of truncation biases against our ﬁnding.
15 The relation is not purely mechanical. We observe that among 68 triennially inspected auditors who received a seriously
deﬁcient PCAOB inspection report from 2005 to 2009, 37 (or 55%) did not have one client in their portfolio of clients restate their
ﬁnancial statements.
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ﬁnd that the probability of restatement is 19.8%, 20.8%, and 26.9% for the clean, deﬁcient, and seriously
deﬁcient reports, respectively. Therefore, receiving a seriously deﬁcient PCAOB report (relative to a
clean) increases the probability by 35.86% (26.9/19.8).
For the all auditors sample, c1 and c2 are consistent with results in column 1, but (c1 + c2) = 0 can-
not be rejected. As in Table 3, we include additional tests in Panel B as we do not have a clean annually
inspected sample to use as a control group. First, we test the incremental difference among annually
inspected auditors and ﬁnd that the Chi-square test for (c2 + c8) = 0 is 4.74 and signiﬁcant at a 5% level.
This result suggests annually inspected auditors receiving a seriously deﬁcient report have a signiﬁ-
cantly higher propensity to restate than annually inspected auditors receiving a deﬁcient report. It
is consistent with the notion PCAOB reports for annually inspected auditors distinguish the restate-
ment aspect of auditing quality and consistent with hypothesis two. Second, we statistically test
the difference between annually inspected auditors and triennially inspected auditors across all types
of PCAOB inspection results. The additional tests suggest that both deﬁcient and seriously deﬁcient
annually inspected clients have lower propensities to restate compared to triennially inspected audi-
tors, regardless of the type of PCAOB inspection report (clean, deﬁcient, and seriously deﬁcient). Except
for LEV, the control variables are consistent with Burns and Kedia (2006).
6.3. Sensitivity analysis
Prior research suggests that quarterly restatements are not as severe as annual restatements
because the annual audits carry more legal and regulatory responsibilities than interim reports.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics and correlation between variables used in the restatement model.
Triennially inspected auditors Annually inspected auditors
Audit deﬁciency
alone (n = 808)
Audit and serious
deﬁciency (n = 202)
Clean (n = 734) Audit deﬁciency
alone (n = 501)
Audit and serious
deﬁciency
(n = 16,846)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
RESTATE 0.22 0.00 0.26* 0.00* 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.19 0.00
LnMVt1 40.64*** 13.56*** 50.46 13.79*** 59.83 22.68 343.58 88.17 3065.29 394.82
BTMt1 0.15** 0.15*** 0.12* 0.18** 0.25 0.28 0.50 0.41 0.53 0.42
LEVt1 1.38*** 0.66*** 1.42*** 0.54** 1.00 0.49 0.53 0.44 0.50 0.46
IND 0.43 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.40 0.00
Deﬁcient Seriously deﬁcient RESTATE LnMVt1 BTMt1 LEVt1
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix
SeriouslyDeﬁcient 0.58***
RESTATE 0.01 0.00
LnMVt1 0.06*** 0.11*** 0.05***
BTMt1 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.02*** 0.06***
LEVt1 0.12*** 0.24*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.41***
IND 0.02** 0.02*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.05***
Notes: The sample consists of 346 auditors (19,091 observations). All variables are measured at the end of ﬁscal year t unless
noted otherwise. Deﬁcient is 1 if the company’s auditor receives a Deﬁcient report from the PCAOB based on investigating year t
ﬁnancial statements, zero otherwise. SeriouslyDeﬁcient is 1 if the company’s auditor receives a Seriously Deﬁcient report from
the PCAOB based on investigating year t ﬁnancial statements, zero otherwise. RESTATE is 1 if the company restated in year t,
zero otherwise. LnMV is equal to the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (in millions). BTM is book value of equity
divided by market value of equity. LEV is total assets minus book value of equity divided by total assets. IND is 1 if the company
is in two-digit SIC industries 35, 36, 38, or 73, zero otherwise. In panel A, the p-values represent differences between triennially
inspected auditors with a deﬁcient or seriously deﬁcient report compared to auditors with a clean report. The p-values for the
statistical signiﬁcance of differences between the mean values are calculated using the paired t-test (Hogg and Tanis, 2001). The
p-values for the statistical signiﬁcance of differences between the median values are calculated using the non-parametric
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. All variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% levels two-tailed.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% levels two-tailed.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% levels two-tailed.
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Therefore, as a sensitivity check, we examine our results using only annual restatements and the re-
sults are robust. In addition, we examine the restatement descriptions provided by Audit Analytics to
address concerns that certain types of restatements such as changes in accounting principal or adop-
tion of new standards add noise to our sample. We identify twelve detailed description categories
related to ‘‘GAAP – Changes in Acct Principles FASB/EITF or Foreign GAAP’’ or ‘‘Retrospective revisions
to p/y ﬁnancials for consistency’’ which may not capture the intended audit quality construct. These
detailed categories suggest that the corresponding restatement may have resulted from a change in
accounting principle and/or retrospective revisions for consistency and not from poor audit quality.
Table 5
Logistic regression results of restatement on PCAOB inspection results and controls.
Triennially inspected auditors (1) All auditors (2)
Panel A: RESTATE = c0 + c1Deﬁcient + c2SeriouslyDeﬁcient + c7Deﬁcient  Annual + c8SeriouslyDeﬁcient  Annual + X  Controls
Intercept 1.887*** 0.925***
(<.0001) (<.0001)
Deﬁcientt 0.056 0.181
(0.70) (0.17)
SeriouslyDeﬁcientt 0.341* 0.379**
(0.07) (0.04)
LnMVt1 0.001 0.000
(0.18) (0.19)
BTMt1 0.002 0.000
(0.53) (0.24)
LEVt1 0.001 0.001
(0.14) (0.11)
INDt 0.075 0.028
(0.56) (0.64)
Deﬁcientt  Annualt 0.471**
(0.02)
SeriouslyDeﬁcientt  Annualt 0.072
(0.78)
Year Effects Yes Yes
No. of Observations 1744 19,091
No. of Firms (clusters) 1292 5608
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.021
Value of (c1 + c2) 0.397 0.198
Chi-square test for (c1 + c2)=0 4.22** 1.09
Coefﬁcient Chi-square test
Panel B: Additional Tests
Seriously deﬁcient annual vs. deﬁcient annual: (c2 + c8) 0.307 4.74**
Deﬁcient annual auditors versus
Clean triennial: (c1 + c7) 0.652 13.74***
Deﬁcient triennial: (c7) 0.471 8.65***
Seriously deﬁcient triennial: (c7  c2) 0.850 12.59***
Seriously deﬁcient annual auditors versus
Clean triennial: (c1 + c2 + c7 + c8) 0.345 11.62***
Deﬁcient triennial: (c2 + c7 + c8) 0.164 2.76*
Seriously deﬁcient triennial: (c7 + c8) 0.543 7.89***
Notes: The all auditors sample consists of 346 auditors (19,091 observations). All variables are measured at the end of ﬁscal year
t unless noted otherwise. Year ﬁxed effects are included. The p-values in parentheses are two-tailed and allow heteroskedas-
ticity and any type of correlations for observations of the ﬁrm but assume independence for observations across different ﬁrms.
Deﬁcient is 1 if the company’s auditor receives a Deﬁcient report from the PCAOB based on investigating year t ﬁnancial
statements, zero otherwise. SeriouslyDeﬁcient is 1 if the company’s auditor receives a Seriously Deﬁcient report from the
PCAOB based on investigating year t ﬁnancial statements, zero otherwise. RESTATE is 1 if the company restated in year t, zero
otherwise. LnMV is equal to the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (in millions). BTM is book value of equity
divided by market value of equity. LEV is total assets minus book value equity divided by total assets. IND is 1 if the company in
two-digit SIC industries 35, 36, 38, and 73, zero otherwise. Annual is 1 if the auditor is annually inspected by the PCAOB, zero
otherwise. All variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% levels two-tailed.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% levels two-tailed.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% levels two-tailed.
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We perform sensitivity analysis excluding restatements in these twelve detailed categories and our
results are robust.
7. Propensity to issue a going concern audit opinion
7.1. Empirical model
In this section, we examine whether an auditor that receives a deﬁcient report from the PCAOB
inspections process is less likely to issue a going concern opinion. The propensity to issue a going con-
cern opinion captures the auditor’s ability to evaluate subsequent ﬁrm performance. If the auditor be-
lieves a company may not survive 12 months, they are responsible for issuing a going concern report.
On the other hand, Francis (2004) states ‘‘the auditor is not responsible for predicting bankruptcy per
se, and it is possible for companies to fail for reasons an auditor could not have reasonably anticipated
12 months in advance.’’ Prior literature interprets an auditor with a lower propensity to issue a going
concern opinion, ceteris paribus, as having lower audit quality. Similar to abnormal accruals, the pro-
pensity to issue a going concern could be related to information or events outside the auditor’s scope
which could introduce noise into the audit quality measure. Following prior literature (DeFond et al.,
2002; Carey and Simnett, 2006; Boone et al., 2010), we estimate the following logistic regression for
companies experiencing ﬁnancial distress (negative earnings or cash ﬂows):
GCt ¼ c0 þ c1Deficientt þ c2SeriouslyDeficientt þ c3ProbBankt þ c4LnASSETt þ c5LnAGEt
þ c6RETURNt þ c7LEVt þ c8CLEVt þ c9LOSSt1 þ c10INVESTt þ c11FINANCEtþ1
þ c12CFOt þ c13REPORTLAGt þ c14Deficientt  Annualþ c15SeriouslyDeficientt
 Annualþ et ð3Þ
Going Concern is the 1 the company receives a going concern audit opinion (from Audit Analytics),
zero otherwise; ProbBank the probability of bankruptcy score (Zmijewski, 1984); LnASSET the natural
logarithm of total assets (in millions); LnAge the natural logarithm of the number of years since the
company was listed on Compustat; RETURN the size adjusted return over the ﬁscal year; LEV the total
assets minus book value divided by total assets; CLEV the change in LEV from t  1 to t and REPORT-
LAG the number of days between ﬁscal year-end and earnings announcement date. All other variables
as previously deﬁned in Eq. (1)
We obtain going concern audit opinions from the Audit Analytics database. We include eleven con-
trol variables that have been found to inﬂuence the likelihood of the company receiving a going con-
cern audit opinion and year ﬁxed effects.16 We include the Zmijewski score (ProbBank) to control for the
probability of bankruptcy and LnASSET to control for the greater negotiating power larger companies
have in the event of ﬁnancial distress. We include age because younger companies are more likely to fail.
RETURN controls for negative relationship between going concern opinions and returns. LEV and CLEV
capture the company’s proximity to debt covenants. Whether the company had a loss in the previous
year (LOSS) is included because companies with multiple-year losses are more likely to fail. Cash ﬂows
(CFO) are included because poor operating cash ﬂows are associated with bankruptcy. INVEST is a liquid-
ity measure that controls for companies with more resources to prevent bankruptcy. FINANCE is in-
cluded because companies with new ﬁnancing have a lower probability of bankruptcy. Lastly, we
include REPORTLAG because going concern opinions are associated with reporting delays.
7.2. Empirical results
Table 6, Panel A, reports the univariate statistics for GC and the control variables used in model (3)
for the triennially inspected and annually inspected separately. For the triennially inspected sample,
16 Since Sengupta (2004) shows that the percentage of institutional holdings is associated with early reporting, as a robustness
check, we include the percentage of shares held by institutional owners (Inst_Holdingt1) in the regression and the results are
qualitatively similar.
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mean GC is 0.49, 0.53, and 0.38 for clients employing an auditor that receives a deﬁcient, seriously
deﬁcient, and clean PCAOB inspection report, respectively. For the annually inspected sample, mean
GC is 0.11 for clients employing an auditor that receives an audit deﬁciency versus 0.09 for clients
employing an auditor that receives a seriously deﬁcient report. Table 6, Panel B reports the correla-
tions for the variables used in model (3).
The results of estimating model (3) are reported in Table 7. For both the all auditors and triennially
inspected samples neither PCAOB report variable is signiﬁcantly different from zero and (c1 + c2) = 0
cannot be rejected. Even though Table 6, Panel A, reveals that GC is signiﬁcantly higher for the deﬁ-
cient and seriously deﬁcient samples relative to the clean sample, after including variables that have
been found to inﬂuence the likelihood of the company receiving a going concern audit opinion the
association is not signiﬁcant. Therefore, we do not ﬁnd support for hypothesis one using the propen-
sity to issue a going concern as our proxy for audit quality.
Related to annually inspected auditors, ﬁrst we ﬁnd that the Chi-square test for (c2 + c15) = 0 is not
signiﬁcant (coefﬁcient = 0.270), suggesting no incremental difference for annually inspected auditors,
which is inconsistent with hypothesis two. Next, the additional tests comparing annually versus tri-
ennially inspected auditors suggest that annually inspected auditors have a lower propensity to issue
a going concern audit report compared to all triennially inspected auditors, regardless of the type of
PCAOB reports. Although audit quality appears to be lower for annually inspected auditors, audit qual-
ity does not depend on the outcome of the PCAOB inspection report. DeFond et al. (2011) and DeFond
and Lennox (2011) show large auditors have signiﬁcantly lower going concern rates than small audi-
tors and suggest that the difference is due to poorer ﬁnancial health and riskiness of the small audi-
tors’ clients. Consistent with these ﬁndings, our dependent variable, GC, has a much lower rate for
annually inspected ﬁrms (9%) relative to triennially inspected ﬁrms (45%). Except for CLEV, our control
variables have the sign predicted by DeFond et al. (2002).
7.3. Sensitivity analysis
Following prior literature, we restrict our sample to distressed companies (negative earnings or
negative cash ﬂows). To test the sensitivity of our results to this restriction, we replicate the analysis
in Table 7 using alternative dependent variables and subsamples. First, we substitute ﬁrst-time going
concern opinions as the dependent variable. Second, recognizing that not all companies that have neg-
ative earnings or negative cash ﬂows deserve a going concern opinion, we estimate model (3) on the
most severely distressed quartile (based on lowest cash ﬂow and earnings). The results and inferences
are similar to Table 7 using these two alternative dependent variables for both the all auditors and tri-
ennially inspected samples.
8. Sensitivity analysis
8.1. Alternative interpretation
An alternative explanation of our triennially inspected auditor results (i.e. deﬁcient PCAOB inspec-
tion reports are associated with lower audit quality) is that PCAOB inspectors devote more resources
and time to an auditor more likely to have low audit quality, ex ante. If PCAOB inspectors devote more
resources and time to a particular auditor, they are more likely to discover an audit deﬁciency (i.e.
reverse causality). Therefore, we run a two-stage model that controls for the resource allocation deci-
sion by the PCAOB in the ﬁrst stage. In particular, we model PCAOB inspection results as a function of
the three auditor-speciﬁc variables. The ﬁrst two variables try to capture the PCAOB’s ex ante assess-
ment of the probability that the auditor is low quality. If the auditor allowed aggressive accounting
choices or the auditor received a deﬁcient peer-review report in prior periods, then the PCOAB may
believe these auditors have a high probability of being low quality and devote more resources to these
auditors. We construct the third variable to capture the observable outcome of the resource allocation
process, speciﬁcally; we calculate the ratio of the number of clients inspected during the PCAOB
inspection process for an auditor (reported in the PCAOB report) to the total number of clients of
K.A. Gunny, T.C. Zhang / J. Account. Public Policy 32 (2013) 136–160 153
Table 6
Descriptive statistics and correlation between variables used in the going concern model for ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.
Triennially inspected auditors Annually inspected auditors
Audit deﬁciency alone
(n = 539)
Audit and serious
deﬁciency (n = 128)
Clean (n = 423) Audit deﬁciency alone
(n = 229)
Audit and serious
deﬁciency (n = 4959)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
GC 0.49*** 0.00*** 0.53*** 1.00*** 0.38 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.00
ProbBank 3.04*** 1.38* 3.58** 0.69** 1.37 1.96 1.76 2.88 2.03 2.86
LnASSET 2.05*** 1.93*** 1.76*** 1.33*** 2.50 2.43 3.92 3.88 4.64 4.54
LnAGE 2.08*** 2.20*** 1.95*** 1.95*** 2.35 2.40 2.58 2.64 2.31 2.30
RETURN 0.49** 0.11* 0.88*** 0.19 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.10 0.41 0.00
LEV 1.51*** 0.69*** 1.78*** 0.84*** 1.14 0.52 0.66 0.45 0.54 0.43
CLEV 0.14 0.02 0.21 0.09 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02
LOSSt1 0.83** 1.00** 0.83 1.00 0.77 1.00 0.73 1.00 0.75 1.00
INVEST 0.32* 0.20 0.30* 0.17 0.35 0.24 0.28 0.18 0.38 0.31
FINANCEt+1 0.29* 0.00* 0.31* 0.00* 0.24 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.33 0.00
CFO 0.62*** 0.23*** 0.56 0.21 0.47 0.17 0.19 0.05 0.16 0.05
REPORTLAG 106.43 90.00*** 122.04** 91.50*** 100.74 90.00 78.09 77.00 68.77 61.00
Deﬁcient Seriously deﬁcient GC ProbBank LnASSET LnAGE RETURN LEV CLEV LOSSt1 INVEST FINANCEt+1 CFO
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix
SeriouslyDeﬁcient 0.56***
GC 0.17*** 0.30***
ProbBank 0.13*** 0.26*** 0.49***
LnASSET 0.24*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.42***
LnAGE 0.02 0.02 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.18***
RETURN 0.03** 0.02 0.02* 0.02 0.07*** 0.08***
LEV 0.13*** 0.26*** 0.48*** 0.78*** 0.34*** 0.00 0.00
CLEV 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.19*** 0.45*** 0.15*** 0.02 0.13*** 0.49***
LOSSt1 0.01 0.04*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.03**
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Table 6 (continued)
Deﬁcient Seriously deﬁcient GC ProbBank LnASSET LnAGE RETURN LEV CLEV LOSSt1 INVEST FINANCEt+1 CFO
INVEST 0.01 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.01 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.06*** 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.24***
FINANCEt+1 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.00 0.04*** 0.02 0.02 0.05*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.02
CFO 0.13*** 0.25*** 0.48*** 0.78*** 0.53*** 0.15*** 0.03** 0.56*** 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.05***
REPORTLAG 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.02 0.02* 0.22*** 0.10*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.04*** 0.15***
Notes: The sample consists of 278 auditors (6278 observations) for which the companies are ﬁnancially distressed. Financially distressed companies are deﬁned as companies with
negative earnings or negative cash ﬂows in year t. All variables are measured at the end of ﬁscal year t unless noted otherwise. Deﬁcient is 1 if the company’s auditor receives a Deﬁcient
report from the PCAOB based on investigating year t ﬁnancial statements, zero otherwise. SeriouslyDeﬁcient is 1 if the company’s auditor receives a Seriously Deﬁcient report from the
PCAOB based on investigating year t ﬁnancial statements, zero otherwise. GC is 1 if company receives a going-concern opinion, zero otherwise. ProbBank is the probability of bankruptcy
score (Zmijewki, 1984). LnASSET is the natural logarithm of total assets (in millions). LnAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the company was listed on Compustat.
RETURN is the size adjusted return over the ﬁscal year. LEV is total assets minus book value of equity divided by total assets. CLEV the change in LEV from t  1 to t. LOSS is 1 if the company
reports a loss, zero otherwise. INVEST is the short- and long-term investment securities (including cash and cash equivalents) divided by total assets. FINANCE is 1 when the company
issues equity or debt, zero otherwise. CFO is cash ﬂow from operating activities divided by total assets. REPORTLAG is the number of days between ﬁscal year-end and the earnings
announcement date. In panel A, the p-values represent differences between triennially inspected auditors with a deﬁcient or seriously deﬁcient report compared to auditors with a clean
report. The p-values for the statistical signiﬁcance of differences between the mean values are calculated using the paired t-test (Hogg and Tanis, 2001). The p-values for the statistical
signiﬁcance of differences between the median values are calculated using the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. All variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level two-tailed.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level two-tailed.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level two-tailed.
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Table 7
Logistic regresion of going concern opinion on PCAOB inspection results for ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.
Triennially inspected auditors (1) All auditors (2)
Panel A: GC = c0 + c1Deﬁcient + c2SeriouslyDeﬁcient + c14Deﬁcient  Annual + c15SeriouslyDeﬁcient  Annual + X  Controls
Intercept 0.262 1.120***
(0.63) (0.00)
Deﬁcientt 0.107 0.109
(0.58) (0.56)
SeriouslyDeﬁcientt 0.075 0.060
(0.79) (0.83)
ProbBankt 0.040 0.012
(0.24) (0.61)
LnASSETt 0.596*** 0.390***
(0.00) (<.0001)
LnAGEt 0.225** 0.137*
(0.03) (0.08)
RETURNt 0.093* 0.079**
(0.10) (0.04)
LEVt 0.538*** 0.662***
(0.00) (<.0001)
CLEVt 0.569*** 0.603***
(0.00) (<.0001)
LOSSt1 0.983*** 1.076***
(0.00) (<.0001)
INVESTt 1.126*** 1.759***
(0.00) (<.0001)
FINANCEt+1 0.136 0.084
(0.48) (0.41)
CFOt 0.507* 1.239***
(0.09) (<.0001)
REPORTLAGt 0.000 0.004***
(0.80) (<.0001)
Deﬁcientt  Annualt 0.878***
(0.00)
SeriouslyDeﬁcientt  Annualt 0.210
(0.59)
Year Effects YES YES
No. of Observations 1090 6278
No. of Firms (clusters) 862 2324
Pseudo R2 0.363 0.380
Value of (c1 + c2) 0.181 0.168
Chi-square test for (c1 + c2)=0 0.01 0.02
Coefﬁcient Chi-square Test
Panel B: Additional Tests
Seriously deﬁcient annual vs. deﬁcient annual: (c2 + c15) 0.270 2.02
Deﬁcient annual auditors versus
Clean triennial: (c1 + c14) 0.770 22.89***
Deﬁcient triennial: (c14) 0.878 9.50***
Seriously deﬁcient triennial: (c14  c2) 0.938 16.00***
Seriously deﬁcient annual auditors versus
Clean triennial: (c1 + c2 + c14 + c15) 0.499 19.36***
Deﬁcient triennial: (c2 + c14 + c15) 0.608 31.36***
Seriously deﬁcient triennial: (c14 + c15) 0.668 12.23***
Notes: The all auditors sample consists of 278 auditors (6278 observations) for which the companies are ﬁnancially distressed.
Financially distressed companies are deﬁned as companies with negative earnings or negative cash ﬂows in year t. All variables
are measured at the end of ﬁscal year t unless noted otherwise. Year ﬁxed effects are included. The p-values in parentheses are
two-tailed and allow heteroskedasticity and any type of correlations for observations of the same ﬁrm but assume indepen-
dence for observations across different ﬁrms. Deﬁcient is 1 if the company’s auditor receives a Deﬁcient report from the PCAOB
based on investigating year t ﬁnancial statements, zero otherwise. SeriouslyDeﬁcient is 1 if the company’s auditor receives a
SeriouslyDeﬁcient report from the PCAOB based on investigating year t ﬁnancial statements, zero otherwise. GC is 1 if company
receives a going-concern opinion, zero otherwise. ProbBank is the probability of bankruptcy score (Zmijewski, 1984). LnASSET is
the natural logarithm of total assets (in millions). LnAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the company was
listed on Compustat. RETURN is the size adjusted return over the ﬁscal year. LEV is total assets minus book value of equity
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the same auditor (RATIO). Therefore, we include accruals, the prior peer-review opinion and RATIO in
the ﬁrst stage regression. In the second stage, we include the residual PCAOB inspection result (which
is orthogonal to the resource allocation proxies) in models (1–3) in place of the actual PCAOB inspec-
tion result. The ﬁrst stage model has a pseudo R2 of 0.033 and the coefﬁcients on the prior peer-review
report and RATIO are signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-tailed). The results using the residual inspection
results suggest that the PCAOB is able to distinguish audit quality for triennially inspected auditor
even after controlling for the resources devoted to each auditor during the inspection process.
8.2. Alternative PCAOB report categorization
We perform tests to determine if there were additional inspection report disclosures that could be
associated with audit quality. Similar to Lennox and Pittman (2010), we categorize PCAOB inspection
reports as follows: (1) NO_TEST that equals one if the report discloses that the audit ﬁrm failed to
undertake an evaluation and zero otherwise and (2) PERFORM_AND_DOCUMENT that equals one if
the PCAOB report includes the phrase such as ‘‘failed to perform and document’’, and zero otherwise.
We re-ran the models in Tables 3, 5 and 7 including these categorizations and did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
association.
8.3. Other sensitivity tests
The results are robust to using similar control variables across audit quality models (1)–(3). The re-
sults are qualitatively similar when we include an auditor-speciﬁc measure of size (i.e. the natural log
of the number of clients for that auditor) as a control variable across audit quality models (1)–(3). We
also controlled for whether the client disclosed an internal control weakness in the current or subse-
quent period and the results are robust in Tables 3, 5 and 7.
9. Conclusion
In 2002, there was a major regulatory shift in the accounting industry. Self-monitoring under the
AICPA was largely replaced by external monitoring under the PCAOB. The PCAOB has four core pro-
gram areas: registration, inspections, standard setting and enforcement. The PCAOB devotes most of
its resources to the inspection division and the inspection team is the single largest group of employ-
ees at the PCAOB. The PCAOB issues an inspection report for every auditor that participates in the
preparation of ﬁnancial statements for publicly traded companies. Given the signiﬁcant regulatory
role placed on PCAOB inspections, which were intended to restore the public trust in the accounting
industry and to improve audit quality, we examine whether PCAOB inspection results are able to dis-
tinguish audit quality during the period inspected, for triennially and annually inspected auditors, to
better understand the impact of this important regulatory tool.
We examine three client-speciﬁcmeasures of audit quality: abnormal current accruals, the propen-
sity to restate, and the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern opinion. For triennially inspected
auditors, we ﬁnd both deﬁcient and seriously deﬁcient PCAOB inspection reports are associated with
lower audit quality measured by higher abnormal current accruals. We, also, ﬁnd seriously deﬁcient
reports for triennially inspected auditors are associated with lower audit quality measured by a great-
er propensity to restate but are not associated with the propensity to issue a going concern report.
divided by total assets. CLEV the change in LEV from t1 to t. LOSS is 1 if the company reports a loss, zero otherwise. INVEST is
the short- and long-term investment securities (including cash and cash equivalents) divided by total assets. Finance is 1 if the
ﬁrm did not engage in a merger or acquisition and number of shares outstanding increased by at least 10%, or long-term debt
increased by at least 20%, or the ﬁrm ﬁrst appeared on the CRSP monthly returns database in year t, zero otherwise. REPORTLAG
is the number of days between ﬁscal year-end and the earnings announcement date. Annual is 1 if the auditor is annually
inspected by the PCAOB, zero otherwise. All variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% levels two-tailed.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% levels two-tailed.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% levels two-tailed.
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With the exception of propensity to issue a going concern, our evidence supports the hypothesis that
audit quality is lower for triennially inspected auditors receiving a seriously deﬁcient report from the
PCAOB relative to an auditor receiving a clean report.
For annually inspected auditors, the results are conﬂicting and suggest PCAOB inspection reports
do not distinguish audit quality during the period inspected. First, we compare seriously deﬁcient an-
nual auditors to deﬁcient annual auditors and the evidence is not conclusive that the former has lower
audit quality than the latter (only the propensity to restate appears to be signiﬁcantly higher but no
difference for the other two audit quality proxies). Second, since no annually inspected auditor re-
ceives a clean PCAOB inspection report, we use triennially inspected auditors that receive a clean re-
port as the control sample. Using this control sample, we ﬁnd conﬂicting evidence that deﬁcient or
seriously deﬁcient reports for annually inspected auditors are associated with lower audit quality.
In addition, when comparing annually inspected auditors to all classiﬁcations of triennially inspected
auditors (clean, deﬁcient, and seriously deﬁcient) and we ﬁnd audit quality difference does not depend
on the type of PCAOB inspection report. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd deﬁcient and seriously deﬁcient
annually inspected auditors appear to have higher audit quality using some proxies (abnormal current
accruals and the propensity to restate) but lower audit quality using other proxy (the propensity to
issue a going concern opinion), furthermore, the results do not differ across different types of PCAOB
inspection reports.
Findings in this paper have implications for researchers. Our results suggest PCAOB inspection re-
ports could possibly be used as an auditor speciﬁc proxy of audit quality for triennially inspected audi-
tors. One caveat is that the PCAOB inspection report does not capture audit quality in terms of the
propensity to issue a going concern audit report to ﬁnancially distressed clients. In addition, our re-
sults are useful to regulators who are interested in evaluating the external monitoring mechanism
of auditors. For example, our results are timely given that Congress is debating whether to extend
the PCAOB inspection program to auditors of broker-dealers and foreign auditors (Roybark, 2009;
PCAOB, 2011) many of whom have auditors that would be categorized as triennially inspected.
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Appendix A. Examples of deﬁcient and seriously deﬁcient results from PCAOB inspection reports
A.1. Deﬁcient
Salberg & Company, P.A. (6/23/2005): The inspection team identiﬁed a matter that it considered to
be an audit deﬁciency. The deﬁciency identiﬁed in one of the audits reviewed was of such signiﬁcance
that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm did not obtain sufﬁcient competent evidential
matter to support its opinion on the issuer’s ﬁnancial statements. The deﬁciency identiﬁed was the
Firm’s failure to perform and document sufﬁcient audit procedures related to certain accounts receiv-
able balances, including evaluating the need for a valuation allowance for those accounts.
Helin, Donovan, Trubee and Wilkinson, LLP (7/13/2006): The inspection team identiﬁed matters that
it considered to be audit deﬁciencies. The deﬁciencies identiﬁed in one of the audits reviewed included
a deﬁciency of such signiﬁcance that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm did not obtain
sufﬁcient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuer’s ﬁnancial statements. That
deﬁciency was the failure to perform and document sufﬁcient audit procedures related to revenue
recognition.
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A.2. Seriously deﬁcient
Sprouse & Anderson, L.L.P. (4/6/2006): The inspection team identiﬁedmatters that it considered to be
audit deﬁciencies. The deﬁciencies identiﬁed in two of the audits reviewed included deﬁciencies of
such signiﬁcance that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm did not obtain sufﬁcient com-
petent evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuer’s ﬁnancial statements. Those deﬁciencies
included – (1) the Firm’s failure to identify, or to address appropriately, a departure from GAAP that
related to a potentially material misstatement in the audited ﬁnancial statements concerning the in-
come statement presentation of provisions for legal settlements as non-operating expenses; and (2)
the failure to perform and document sufﬁcient audit procedures to support the Firm’s use of the work
of a specialist.
BDO Seidman (Issuer A) (11/17/2005): During one audit, the Firm failed to identify a departure from
GAAP that it should have identiﬁed and addressed before issuing its audit report. The issuer misclas-
siﬁed its revolving line of credit as a long-term liability rather than as a current liability. The issuer’s
classiﬁcation was not in accordance with Emerging Issues Task Force (‘‘EITF’’) Issue No. 95-22, Balance
Sheet Classiﬁcation of Borrowings Outstanding under Revolving Credit Agreements That Include both a Sub-
jective Acceleration Clause and a Lock-Box Arrangement. The issuer subsequently restated its prior year’s
balance sheet to classify the debt as a current liability.
Source: PCAOB Release Nos. 104-2005-020, 104-2006-145, 104-2006-101, and 104-2005-118
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